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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Professor Ritola notes that there are two key epistemic accounts of the fallacy of begging 
the question in the literature: the objective account, OBQ and the subjective account, 
SBQ. OBQ involves the claim that an argument begs the question if “one of the premises 
cannot be justifiably believed independently of the conclusion.” (p. 1) On the other hand, 
SBQ involves the claim that an argument begs the question if “the arguer’s belief in some 
premise is dependent on the belief in the conclusion or on reasons to believe the 
conclusion.” (p. 1) The author then goes on to consider an objection to the OBQ approach 
arguing that it does not deal a decisive blow to OBQ in favour of SBQ, and in the end 
concludes that both analyses of begging the question should be retained. What I wonder 
about is whether one can ever argue without circularity that an argument in favour of a 
given account of begging the question does not itself beg the question. To make such an 
argument, one would need to appeal either to the account of begging the question that 
they are trying to defend, which seems circular, or to another account which itself can be 
defended only if the argument in favour of it does not beg the question. We would need 
to determine whether this is the case appealing either to that account or to another 
account. And so on. 
 
2. HOW DO WE KNOW IF ANY ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF RETAINING AN 
ACCOUNT OF BEGGING THE QUESTION DOESN’T BEG THE QUESTION? 
 
For simplicity’s sake only, suppose there are only two plausible epistemic accounts of 
begging the question: OBQ and SBQ as Professor Ritola characterizes them. An 
argument in favour of OBQ contains a number of premises having the following 
schematic form: P1, P2, …., Pn, therefore, C where C is “OBQ should be retained.” Does 
this argument beg the question from an epistemic point of view? To determine this, we 
would need to appeal to an epistemic account of begging the question. If we use OBQ we 
would have to determine whether justifiably believing any of the premises depends on 
justifiably believing the conclusion. At the end of the critical examination of this 
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argument to retain OBQ, we either conclude that the argument begs the question 
according to OBQ or that it doesn’t.  
 Regardless of what we conclude, we are using OBQ, an account that is being 
argued for, to determine whether an argument in favour of retaining it begs the question. 
But this works only if OBQ has already been successfully argued for in a separate 
argument. But how do we know that that argument doesn’t beg the question? To avoid 
circularity, we could use SBQ to determine if our argument in favour of retaining OBQ 
begs the question. At the end of the critical examination of the argument to retain OBQ, 
we either conclude that the argument to retain OBQ begs the question in sense of SBQ or 
that it doesn’t. However, this time around, we are not using the very account being 
argued for to vindicate or refute the argument in favour of that account. Circularity is 
circumvented. 
 However, how do we know whether SBQ that we used to vindicate or refute our 
argument for OBQ is an account that should be retained? We would need to critically 
examine arguments in favour of SBQ to determine if those arguments beg the question. 
But now we are faced with the same difficulty as above. If we use SBQ as a standard to 
determine whether an argument in favour of retaining SBQ begs the question, then we are 
employing circular reasoning. For SBQ can be used to determine whether an argument in 
favour of it begs the question only if SBQ has been successfully argued for in a separate 
argument. Then we would need to determine whether that argument begs the question, 
which can be established only if SBQ has already been successfully argued for. And so 
on. 
 Perhaps we could use OBQ to determine whether the argument that SBQ should 
be retained begs the question. But the problem with this approach is that we are using 
SBQ to show that arguments in favour of OBQ do not beg the question, and an argument 
for SBQ is exactly what is under critical scrutiny. So we cannot use OBQ to vindicate 
arguments in favour of SBQ because SBQ is being used to vindicate arguments in favour 
of OBQ. Suspending our assumption that there are only two plausible epistemic accounts 
of begging the question, one way out of the circle is to appeal to a third epistemic account 
of begging the question, call it XBQ. We could use XBQ to vindicate (or refute) 
arguments for both OBQ and SBQ, and so the circularity has been avoided. 
 However, the new question is whether arguments in favour of retaining XBQ beg 
the question. We can’t use XBQ to determine this because XBQ is exactly what’s under 
scrutiny. So perhaps we could use either SBQ or OBQ to determine whether the 
arguments in favour of XBQ beg the question. But XBQ is being used to determine 
whether arguments in favour of retaining SBQ and OBQ beg the question. So this won’t 
work. Then perhaps there is a fourth epistemic account of begging the question, call it 
YBQ that can be used to determine whether arguments in favour of SBQ, OBQ and XBQ 
beg the question. But how do we know whether arguments in favour of YBQ beg the 
question? To avoid circularity, we can’t use SBQ, OBQ, XBQ to determine this. Then we 
would need to appeal to a fifth epistemic account of begging the question, call it ZBQ. 
And so on.  
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3. CONCLUSION  
 
In this short commentary, I have not taken Professor Ritola’s arguments in favour of 
retaining OBQ and SBQ to task. However, what I have tried to do is call into question 
whether it is possible to critically evaluate any argument in favour of either account 
without begging the question. Of course, my argument for this may also beg the question, 
though I’m not sure how I could know that. 
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